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WHY WARGAMING WORKS
Peter P. Perla and ED McGrady
Wargaming has a long history as an important tool for military training,education, and research.1 In its broader application to nonmilitary con-
flict situations (see, for example, the recent books Wargaming for Leaders and
Business War Games), the technique is increasing in popularity, particularly
among businesses seeking strategic advantages.2 (As a result, we will sometimes
use the terms “wargaming” and “gaming” interchangeably; in the latter case,
however, we mean what is called “serious gaming,” not the more general sense,
like gambling.)3 Despite that history and popularity, however, wargaming’s rec-
ord of success is uneven. Some games seem to succeed very well in preparing im-
portant decision makers for real-world environments
in which they later find themselves. A prime example
is the U.S. Navy’s series of games during the 1920s and
1930s, which helped train the commanders who won
the Second World War in the Pacific. Other games do
not do so well; for example, the game played by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency in July 2004
did not seem to help that agency respond effectively to
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall only two years later.
The reasons for the successes and failures of
wargames of all types are as varied as the games them-
selves. Sometimes success stems from particular cir-
cumstances of subject matter and participants;
sometimes failure flows from poor design or faulty
facts. When it works, wargaming can appear almost
magical in its power to inform and instruct; when it
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doesn’t work, it can appear almost childish in its oversimplifications and
abstractions.
We believe that wargaming’s power and success (as well as its danger) derive
from its ability to enable individual participants to transform themselves by
making them more open to internalizing their experiences in a game—for good
or ill. The particulars of individual wargames are important to their relative suc-
cess, yet there is an undercurrent of something less tangible than facts or models
that affects fundamentally the ability of a wargame to transform its participants.
This article explores that undercurrent. We characterize it in terms of the re-
lationships among wargaming (in its broadest sense), narrative storytelling, and
the inner workings of the human brain. We propose the idea that gaming’s
transformative power grows out of its particular connections to storytelling; we
find in a combination of elements from traditional narrative theory and con-
temporary neuroscience the germ of our thesis—that gaming, as a story-living
experience, engages the human brain, and hence the human being participating
in a game, in ways more akin to real-life experience than to reading a novel or
watching a video. By creating for its participants a synthetic experience, gaming
gives them palpable and powerful insights that help them prepare better for
dealing with complex and uncertain situations in the future. We contend that
the use of gaming to transform individual participants—in particular, key deci-
sion makers—is an important, indeed essential, source of successful organiza-
tional and societal adaptation to that uncertain future.
We find inspiration and support for this position in an intriguing book by the
German psychologist Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure.4 In this work,
Dörner argues that “geniuses are geniuses by birth, whereas the wise gain their
wisdom through experience. And it seems to me that the ability to deal with
problems in the most appropriate way is the hallmark of wisdom rather than ge-
nius.”5 In simplest terms, Dörner believes that we need to “learn to deal with dif-
ferent situations that place different demands on us. And we can teach this skill,
too—by putting people into one situation, then into another, and discussing
with them their behavior and, most important, their mistakes. The real world
gives us no chance to do this.” But games do. The need to explore, repeat, and re-
flect on decisions made in the context of games is critical to what we must do to
learn better how to cope with a world rapidly moving beyond our range of real
experiences. Improving the ability of our games to help us do this, in turn, de-
mands that we improve our understanding of why wargaming works.
NARRATIVE AND GAMING
We begin our exploration by considering the relationships between narrative
and gaming. Throughout human history, narrative—storytelling—has been a
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fundamental way to understand events we did not or cannot experience. Narra-
tives take many forms, but the best ones succeed in placing those who experience
them into the flow of events and activities they describe. A suspension of disbe-
lief occurs as readers, watchers, or listeners experience the vicarious emotions
and actions brought out by the narrative. Exploring this idea further, we will dis-
cuss research—literary, psychological, and neurological—that has illuminated
the processes by which this suspension of disbelief occurs.
Games are participatory narrative experiences. There are many different types
of games, from the board games of our childhood to modern computer and on-
line games, and to that mainstay of military games, the tabletop or seminar game
(or even the derisively named BOGSAT—Bunch of Guys Sitting around the Ta-
ble).6 Although this article applies to games in general, much of our default per-
spective derives from this latter class of games, so familiar to the denizens of
McCarty Little Hall, in Newport. At their most intense level, which we call
“high-engagement games,” games draw players into both participating in and
constructing their narratives; they literally place the players inside the narratives.
In fact, gaming is an even more powerful way to experience narrative than reading
a book or watching a film. Like literature and film, high-engagement games give
players a taste of the emotional and empathetic challenges they may face during
situations like those presented in the game. Unlike literature and film, games give
players active responsibility for their decisions, similar to what they would experi-
ence in the real world, and force them to bear many of the same consequences of
those decisions, both positive and negative.
Those consequences include not only the physical changes to the decision-
making environment (such as the loss in battle of an important warship) but
also the psychological effects of both making those decisions and dealing with
their effects. For example, during a large-scale real-world disaster, decision mak-
ers will face emotional and psychological stresses as well as operational chal-
lenges. Strictly intellectual exercises, including simple, scenario-based planning,
seldom create emotional or psychological stress. Indeed, no planning system or
training tool can cover every possible contingency or produce the same stresses
experienced in reality. Real people do not die in wargames. Nevertheless, effec-
tive high-engagement games can equip leaders better to confront whatever con-
tingency they must actually face, regardless of its similarity in detail to the game
actually played. Leaders responsible for making crisis decisions and living with
their consequences will benefit from the synthetic experience derived from play-
ing high-engagement games—as well as from the additional mental tools they
can develop through that experience—to help ready themselves for confronting
those challenges. At the very least, these synthetic experiences will help prepare
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them to ask the critical questions during planning and preparation for the un-
predictable range of possible futures.7
Synthetic Experience through Stories
Literature and cinema are ways in which nearly everyone has experienced real
situations and events synthetically. An example of literature affecting policy is the
story of how Richard Preston’s novel The Cobra Event influenced then-president
William Clinton.8 As Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg report in their own book
Plague Wars, “Ironically, everything that Clinton had previously learned about
biological terrorism from official sources did not have as much effect on him as
the Preston novel. The book found a curious resonance within Clinton, which
led to a profound interest and concern about the threat. Indeed, Clinton was so
alarmed by what he read that he asked U.S. intelligence experts to assess the
book’s credibility.”9
At about the same time, in March 1998, the White House ran a wargame on
biological terrorism. These events combined to cause the president to call a spe-
cial cabinet meeting on bioterrorism on 10 April 1998. As a result of this meet-
ing, Mangold and Goldberg report, President Clinton asked Congress to add
$294 million to the counterterrorism budget.10
The dramatization of the narrative in The Cobra Event (and the reinforce-
ment of that experience in the game) seemed to access parts of President
Clinton’s imagination and attention that other sources of information could
not. By showing him the consequences, including the political and social dan-
gers, of such an event, the narrative became a powerful warning of what he him-
self would face in the event of a biological incident.
But what does narrative do that is different from other forms of discourse?
After all, plenty of words had been written in the open-source and intelligence
literature about the threat of biological weapons before President Clinton read
The Cobra Event. What makes telling a good story more powerful than other
forms of communication?
The Power of Prose
To explore this question more fully, we turn now to literary theory. Let’s begin by
delving into the meaning of prose.
“Prose” is a generic term that can mean any writing that is designed to mimic
everyday speech in its rhythms and word choice (i.e., prose is not verse). Prose
can be divided further into whether it concerns facts (nonfiction) or is imagina-
tive (fiction). Prose can also be divided according to the mode of writing: expo-
sition, argumentation, description, or narrative. At its most basic level, prose is
simply words with meaning that are written on a page or spoken. This literalist,
or factual, aspect of prose would mean that the words “he picked up the gun and
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shot” both are the actual words and letters (hepickedupthegunandshot) and
convey the everyday meaning that we would ascribe to them (the act of obtain-
ing possession of a particular weapon and firing it).
Prose that tells a story (the narrative form) creates meanings that go beyond
the effect of simply presenting facts; the narrative forms an image in the reader’s
mind of the thing being described. Likewise, narrative can cause the reader to re-
act emotionally to the information being presented—to laugh, cry, feel afraid.
These emotions are not contained in the facts presented on the page or in the lit-
eral meaning of the words. Rather, they are created in the reader’s mind by the
interaction between the reader and the words on the page. Here the meaning of
“he picked up the gun and shot” may invoke a range of emotions or empathetic
feelings, depending on its context in the overall story line.
Between the literal presentation of words on the page and the reader’s reac-
tion to them, there is a place that does not exist in the real world but that has real
effects on the reader’s mind. In literary theory this is called the l’entre deux, the
“between place.” It is in this in-between world, where narrative is real and every-
day reality has retreated into the deep background, that the reader engages in
what we all learned about in high school, the suspension of disbelief. The l’entre
deux is real for the reader, even if it is nowhere to be found on the page. It is nei-
ther on the page nor absent from the world. It is not in the world as constructed
in the literal meaning of the words on the page. It is between the real and the un-
real, between the reader and the page.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge first used the term “suspension of disbelief ” to
mean “transfer from our [the author’s] inward nature [of] a human interest and
a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that
willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.”11
In other words, the author creates a fantasy or fictional narrative that is suffi-
ciently engaging (the author’s responsibility to the reader being itself a major
theme of literary theory) to cause the reader to believe in what is not there—that
is, to have “poetic faith.”
If you parse Coleridge’s statement carefully, you will see that the focus is on
the author’s ability to create the suspension of disbelief. It does not refer to the
reader’s giving the author the benefit of the doubt, as is sometimes meant when
the term is applied to games. Here we use Coleridge’s sense, one that places the
requirement squarely on the author (or game designer) to affect the reader (or
player). All the reader has to do is enter honestly into the narrative; suspension
of disbelief will happen if the author has constructed a believable story world
populated by believable characters.
There are, in fact, several different ways of looking at suspension of disbelief:
from the literary perspective, as a phenomenon created by the author and
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entered into by the reader; from the philosophical perspective, understanding
what is real and what claim imaginary realities have on being real; from the psy-
chological and cognitive-science perspective, which views thought and belief as
interrelated processes of perception and understanding; and, finally, from the
neuroscience perspective, where imagination becomes a sequence of neural and
perceptive processes that occur, starting with raw perception and leading to be-
lief about the nature of the world. This intersection of literature, philosophy,
cognitive science, and neurology gives us a number of independent perspectives
on how this phenomenon works and how we should consider it.
A View from Neuroscience
Now let’s take a step beyond literary theory into the realms of the biological and
psychological study of the human brain. Neuroscientists and psychologists
studying belief and perception model the suspension of disbelief as a multistep
process. When suspension of disbelief occurs, the reader enters into a half-real
state where all of the information provided at the time of reading is believed, but
upon almost immediate reflection some of it is discounted as fiction.12 That is,
before any higher thought processes are engaged, at the initial moment of per-
ceiving the words on the page readers will believe all of what they read, but upon
further consideration they dismiss some of its elements as “fiction” and accept
other elements as “real.” The process used to determine whether or not we be-
lieve what we read is known as the “systematic” system; it is slower to react than
the “automatic” system that first processes the work of fiction. What determines
the extent to which a narrative or other piece of prose invokes the systematic sys-
tem and at what intensity is the extent to which we can take real action on the ba-
sis of that information.13 Without the need to take real action, the systematic
system may be invoked at a lesser intensity or not invoked at all.
Neurological experiments suggest that this dual process of understanding is
at work when we consume any sort of fiction or art. For example, scientists con-
ducted a test with students by giving them two text passages to read. One factu-
ally described the process by which George Washington became the first
president; the other used dramaturgical techniques to create some uncertainty
as to whether he would be elected. Depending on which passage they had read,
students had different reaction times to the subsequent question, “Was George
Washington the first president?” The students reading the less cut-and-dried
passage took longer to answer, even though they “knew perfectly well that in fact
George Washington was elected the first president.”14 This suggested to the ex-
perimenters that the answer came more slowly due to the lack of clarity in the
narrative, which made students believe, even if temporarily or fleetingly, that
Washington may not have become president.15 This effect is called “anomalous
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suspense.”16 As we read a narrative we briefly believe both the truth of the world
as we know or believe it to be and the untruth that is presented by the narrative.
It is only afterward that the slower process of sorting out fact from fiction oc-
curs. That sorting process is driven by our analysis of whether we can or must act
on the information presented.
This experiment and its conclusions seem a bit odd, even to us, and it doesn’t
prove much. It is, however, suggestive and agrees with our own sense of that
brief resetting of reality that sometimes occurs after reading a good novel, seeing
a great film, or playing a powerful game.
This dependence on the possibility of action is an important component of a
neurological understanding of the human mind. Perception and understanding
are both tangled up with the problem of acting in the world, because the brain is
designed not only to work within itself in some abstract intellectual environ-
ment but also to move our whole organism physically through the real world.17
“Reality checking involves a continual assessment of the relation between be-
havior and the environment.”18 Thus, while we are suspending our disbelief in a
narrative, we are also not yet engaged in the practical process of deciding
whether we can use the information we perceive from that narrative to act in the
real world. Ultimately we get around to making this decision, even if some of the
blurriness of the difference stays with us.
Cognitive-theoretical attempts to distinguish between imagination and be-
lief have constructed a concept similar to the l’entre deux. Scientists define a
“pretense box,” where pretenses (or imaginative flights) are distinguished from
beliefs or desires by the function they perform. Pretenses, beliefs, and desires are
functionally different, but one hypothesis holds that all three are processed by
the same code within the mind, resulting in effects for a pretense similar to those
for a belief. The pretense for belief activates our response to a situation, but it is
tempered by the separate and contrary pretense that the situation is fictional.19
Games as Constructed Narrative
So what does all of the preceding discussion of narrative and cognition have to
do with wargaming? Wargames, particularly what we call high-engagement
games, extend the imaginative work of art or literature into the physical world
and place the participants in control of some portion of the narratives. Players
are participants, not merely spectators. As a result, high-engagement games em-
body two types of narrative: the “presented narrative,” which is what we call the
written or given narrative, created by the game’s designers; and the “constructed
narrative,” which is developed through the actions, statements, and decisions of
the game’s participants. The overall game narrative comprises both the pre-
sented narrative and the constructed narrative.
P E R L A & M C G R A D Y 1 1 7
NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:57 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
7
Perla and McGrady: Why Wargaming Works
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
The concept of constructed narrative implies that the players are confronted
by active choices and that in response to those choices—and consequent to their
physical presence in the narrative—they must construct responses to the game’s
presented narrative. This response is a separate discourse of the players, which
merges with the presented narrative of the game to create a synthetic product
that is not exclusively that of the players or of the game designers. Players in a
high-engagement game not only make choices but also speak and act to explain
to other participants their choices—as well as their reactions to the choices of
the game designer and the other players. This creates a conversation among ev-
eryone involved in the game, one that creates a unique narrative.
In the same way that traditional narratives can invoke emotional or suspense-
ful responses in their viewers, the narrative arc of a game can invoke a range of
emotions in its participants. Players can become excited at the expectation of a
significant victory or apprehensive at the possibility that an opponent will ex-
ploit a weakness. Likewise, games can present unpleasant information or place
players in upsetting situations, resulting in arguments or heated exchanges.
These emotions are equivalent to the normal sense of suspension of disbelief,
whereby an inanimate and abstract narrative brings about a real-world reaction
in the viewers.
As narratives, then, games can create the same reaction as any story. But
high-engagement games are more than simple narratives; they employ ranges of
physical cues, as do movies or stage plays. The latter rely on visual, auditory, and
symbolic cues (cues with social meaning beyond their meanings as everyday ob-
jects); a game extends the range of cues to include the physical venue where the
game takes place, the control of game play, the physical actions of the players
(kinesthetic cues), the social interactions among the players, and dramaturgical
effects revolving around those social interactions. These elements are unique to
games, and in particular they are most powerfully present in live-action role
playing—the quintessential high-engagement games.20
The Venue. Although visual and auditory cues from the game designers make
up the basis for the game—they are the way the overall scenario and narrative
are presented to the players—they in no way make up all of the game. The most
basic element of the game experience is the venue, the physical space in which
the players act during the game. The venue could be as simple as a tabletop with
a map on it or as elaborate as a multimedia, multiroom environment where play-
ers interact with each other, with technology, and with a wide range of services
during the course of the game. The venue creates among the players and the
game controllers spatial and temporal relationships in a way most similar to the
role that the physical stage and set play in live theater. These physical
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relationships can reflect and help organize hierarchical or communications rela-
tionships. The venue also organizes players and their interactions into group-
ings that depend on the size and layout of the physical area (or perhaps even the
computer network) used. One often-overlooked aspect of game design is, in
fact, adapting the game concept and design to the physical plant that is available.
Game Control. The aspect of a wargame that is most noticeably different from
other narrative forms, including a stage play, is the concept of “control.” There
are two broad classes of control, which are found in different measure according
to the game’s design. “Active control” relies on human game controllers, who
closely follow player actions and respond to those actions in real time to drive
the game forward. “Passive control” relies on a predefined rules set that the play-
ers interact with instead of human controllers. In this latter case, computer con-
soles, game map, or other displays and player aids help the players visualize the
game’s universe, encode the rules, and spatially organize player actions and
options.
Kinesthetic Cues. What is not controlled by the game designers is how the play-
ers participate in the world the designers have created and how they interact
with each other. Kinesthetic cues occur as players take action and move through
space during the game. Cues could be as simple as players walking over to some-
one to talk, or they could involve actual manipulation of objects, such as minia-
ture representations of the world—for example, maps, telephones, briefing
slides, or even physical or conceptual and mathematical models. Unlike the
other ways in which the game designer’s narrative influences the player’s experi-
ence, the movement of the players within the game space is (usually) entirely up
to the players. The venue and game structure (rules and scenario, for example)
can influence how a player acts in a game, but players’ actions are ultimately sep-
arate, uncontrolled elements of the game, distinct from the presented game
narrative.
Social Interactions. The social and cultural interactions that occur in the game
create new ways of presenting and changing the narrative experience of the play-
ers. The social element of the game affects the way in which players present
themselves to the game world and the other players. Because human social per-
ceptions are attuned to understanding the intentions and behavior of people
and groups, this self-presentation adds a significant amount of information to
the experience.
In a high-engagement game two sets of social relationships are present, those
of the real world and those of the game world. These relationships play off one
another; often the people experiencing the game have social or organizational
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relationships in the real world. These relationships affect the type and nature of
acceptable behavior in the game. On the other hand, the game also enables be-
haviors that might not occur in the real world—because, after all, “it’s only a
game.” This interplay between real-world and game-world relationships can be
exploited by the game designer to create a dynamic tension that can allow play-
ers to identify and work through real-world organizational conflicts using the
mechanism of role playing in the game.
Dramaturgical Effects. Dramaturgical effects are signals that people send in so-
cial situations to establish both their identities and the overall social relation-
ship.21 Business scholarship, in attempting to understand all of the elements that
go into organizational relationships and decision making, hypothesizes that
within the context of a social situation people do things to present themselves to
others in a way that resembles theater more than it does rational organizational
processes. An example is the way charismatic leaders treat their subordinates
(think of General George S. Patton’s famous statement that his staff didn’t need
to know when he was acting, as long as he did himself) or how they frame them-
selves as respected in their fields, as intelligent or powerful (think of theme mu-
sic, such as “Hail to the Chief ”). All of the various elements of self-presentation
—what you say (scripting), where you say it (staging), how you act (perform-
ing), and how you “spin” it (framing)—go into creating the “dramaturgical
presence.”22 People’s identities, both their views of themselves and how others
view them, come from the social interactions they experience. They are not
fixed, through some internal function.
In a game, as in real life, players must present themselves to others in such a
way as to reinforce the social identities they have constructed. By extension,
players also represent or present their parent organizations’ identities to others
in the context of the game. When required to represent functions different from
their normal personae or to embody types of persons different from their nor-
mal selves, players face an unusual social situation. Because they know their
roles in games are constructed ones, they can enter into them in ways that differ
from how they might normally present themselves in real social situations. Like-
wise, their play in a game is different from performing in a stage play, because on
stage the actor is interpreting the script and director’s instructions, not (usually)
making it all up on the spot.
The l’Entre Deux of Games
As a result of those considerations discussed above, the players enter into a
game’s l’entre deux in a way entirely different from the reader’s process of sus-
pending disbelief in a traditional narrative. The combination of venue, kines-
thetic actions, social interactions, and dramaturgical effects—all moderated and
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responded to via active or passive control—allows the players to come closer to
entering literally into the world of the game than they ever could in a watched or
read narrative. For the game, the l’entre deux does, in some ways, actually exist
outside of the players’ minds—in their actions and their interactions with other
players. Because they are dramaturgical actors in the game, the players occupy a
“between place” far closer to reality for them than do passive spectators or read-
ers of other narrative forms.
If we consider the cognitive-neuroscience model we discussed previously, the
normal narrative disbelief that arises from a reader’s inability to act on the infor-
mation presented in a text narrative is foiled in a game, because the player actu-
ally can (and must) act on the narrative information the game presents.
Likewise, because they occupy a constructed narrative (the game) as well as con-
structed dramaturgical identities (their roles in the game), the players need to
think as if they are in a real world in order to maintain their game identities
—further working against disbelief. In games, then, disbelief is suspended twice,
once when the players enter into their roles and again when they use their new
(game) identities to construct the game’s narrative.
Thus, games can be divided into narrative elements (those things that the de-
signers present to advance the story) and dramaturgical elements (those that re-
quire the players to take some action in the real world). Visual, auditory,
symbolic, and venue cues form the backbone of the narrative elements in a
game; the players construct the rest of the narrative through their kinesthetic ac-
tions, their social interactions, and dramaturgical effects. All of this means that
players invest in the game more of their own identities—as well as their concep-
tions of what is real and fictional—than they do in a prosaic narrative. Because
of the stronger l’entre deux that the players enter during the game, that invest-
ment can have a more substantial effect on the participants than would a tradi-
tional narrative. The players own the between world, and for them it becomes
less fictional and more real.
GAMING AND REALITY
Games have their rhetorical modes, and, just as other narratives do, games can
have effects in the real world. However, a game is also a trick, a sleight of hand
that makes the players believe, if only temporarily, that they are someone else
doing something else. As with any fictitious narrative, at the end of the game the
players will recognize that the events they experienced in it were not real experi-
ences; that the roles they occupied were not their real jobs and lives; and that the
narrative they helped create did not happen in the real world. However, any
compelling narrative that has affected its readers or viewers emotionally leaves
an effect even after the suspended disbelief in the narrative’s reality has worn off.
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After games, because of their stronger l’entre deux, players carry with them even
more of the conflict between reality and fiction that the games created. The
game’s narrative is the player’s narrative as much as it is the designer’s or the
controller’s (or the sponsor’s). It is created by the players and owned by them, in
a joint effort with the designers and controllers.
The l’entre deux the players enter through a game’s narrative forces them to
assume responsibility for the actions and events that occur as a result. It places
the consequences of their decisions and actions before the players, and in fact it
places those consequences directly on the players. Having to assume responsibil-
ity for the consequences of their own actions (as well as of those events beyond
their control) gives the players insight about the emotional, psychological, and
personal consequences that a real event would have for the actual decision mak-
ers whose roles they assumed during the game. The game creates empathy in the
players for the roles they are playing, through the suspension of disbelief. Fur-
ther, because the players are more inclined to see a role-playing game acted in
the real world as part of both the l’entre deux and the real world, they bring these
emotional and psychological states with them back into the real world after the
game ends.
Prosaic writing limits itself to accepted signs and meanings in order to convey
its facts. Great prose and great games capture meanings that have never been
said—meanings that have not yet been recorded as narratives—and make them
accessible to readers or players.23 High-engagement games dealing with specula-
tive or future events capture those new meanings and make them accessible.
Those new meanings created within the players and brought with them out of
the game—out of the l’entre deux and into the real world—affect how the play-
ers will act not only during events of the kinds considered in the game but also
during any future events they may encounter.
What does this mean? It means that in high-engagement role-playing games
we have a powerful tool that can be used to help players learn how better to bal-
ance the equation between the cost of preparing for the uncertain future and
the risk of not doing so; can help enlighten players about the fact that unex-
pected and unpredictable events, including embarrassing ones, do happen and
that there are real consequences when they do. Without that synthetic experi-
ence, it’s all too easy to dismiss the most challenging of possible events, partic-
ularly when the conventional wisdom presumes that it is simply not worth the
cost of preparing for the emotional, psychological, and cultural consequences
of contingencies so unlikely. When players have experienced both the personal
and organizational costs of such Black Swan events—if only during a
game—they develop new perspectives on them.24 Probabilities affect budgets
and lines of authority; consequences affect emotions, relationships, and values.
1 2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:57 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 3, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/8
High-engagement games mask the pressures of the former and so give the play-
ers unique opportunities to experience the challenges of the latter.
CAUTIONS
Of course, wise practitioners must be as cautious when using high-engagement
games as must be any wise user of power tools. Games can use the power of nar-
rative persuasion to manipulate players into false beliefs and assumptions in any
number of ways. For that reason, game designers have a responsibility to avoid
many of the common mistakes that organizations make when they consider fu-
ture challenges. These errors include both presenting mistaken information or
under- or overstating the dangers involved in these events (i.e., just getting it
wrong) and also what we call “the sanitary fantasy”—assuming that nothing can
ever possibly go wrong and no one will ever misbehave.
Just Getting It Wrong
Games that make this error embed the players in a narrative that creates a false
impression about the danger and consequences of a future event or situation.
This can cut either way—minimizing the consequences or exaggerating them
beyond what is reasonable. In both cases the game has lied to the players, which
will result either in their learning incorrect lessons or in their disbelieving the
outcomes and recommendations that flow from the game—even the most rea-
sonable and applicable ones, least affected by the lies.
A good example of just getting it wrong is the Dark Winter game. Dark Winter
was a high-level decision-making game about smallpox response held from 22
to 23 June 2001 by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The game involved many
people who at one time or another in their careers actually would have been in-
volved in a response to smallpox. They included former governors, senior lead-
ers of the public health and homeland security communities, and a former
senator, Sam Nunn, playing the role of president of the United States. The game
got it wrong in positing a 1:10 transmission rate for smallpox, a very large inci-
dence that would result in a widespread and virtually unstoppable catastrophe.25
Of course, using too low a rate might have produced an equally exaggerated re-
sult in the other direction.
Given that games such as these affect the emotional and psychological rela-
tionship of the players with the subject matter, it could be argued that a more
emotionally compelling but less physically severe outbreak could have created
similar stresses on the players without overestimating the physical threat of the
disease. For example, the victim population could have been smaller but more
emotionally affecting, such as immuno-compromised individuals or pregnant
women. Or the threat of the unknown, represented by only one or two cases,
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could have been played against the players’ imaginations, letting them feel the
impending doom of a worst-case scenario but without predicting large numbers
of downstream casualties.
The exercise received considerable official and media attention at the time,
reflecting the emotional reactions that many of the senior-level participants had
to confronting a serious disease outbreak that they had little or no capability to
stop. Senator Nunn’s testimony is interesting in his use of emotional language;
for example, referring to the two days of play by the team representing the Na-
tional Security Council, he stated, “I will skip the agonizing details. . . . [O]ur
NSC ‘war gamers’ dealt with three weeks of simulated shock, stress, and hor-
ror.”26 However, the exercise also received considerable criticism for overstating
the danger and for presenting a biological attack as an apocalyptic threat that
could be overcome only by herculean effort.27 Even more disturbing, some of the
assumptions made in Dark Winter have been applied to other biological agents
in other exercises.28 In his testimony before Congress after the game, Senator
Nunn stated, “I determined from our wargame that public health has become a
national security issue, but that we are unprepared. . . . The members of our sim-
ulated NSC, as well as state and local officials, were desperate.” Creating such
desperation testified to the power of the gaming narrative; in this case, however,
doing so by overstating the physical transmissibility of the disease illustrated
how easily wrong (or at least questionable) facts can skew the experience in ways
that can distort the insights the game creates.
The Sanitary Fantasy
The sanitary fantasy is much more difficult to detect (and so to correct) than
simply getting it wrong. It is not about what is included in the game but rather
what is left out. The effect can be illustrated by a quick example: design a game to
capture the strategic decisions faced by the United States over the course of the
war in Iraq. Elements such as the challenges of building an alliance, the ability to
engage and destroy insurgents, and the restoration of services to the population
all would be obvious pieces to include in the design.
But there is a Black Swan, one that circles above the design of any game of
modern irregular conflict. How do you deal with those things you cannot expect
or anticipate, because they are so at odds with how you see the world that you
cannot possibly, either emotionally or politically, imagine their happening?
Things that violate your fundamental worldview, like Abu Ghraib?29 If it does
not include factors like Abu Ghraib, and its subsequent effect on how the United
States was viewed in the Arab world, it is unlikely that any game architecture
could present an effective, realistic scenario, particularly on the emotional and
political levels. Military wargames can sometimes reduce the likelihood of such
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failures by incorporating freely acting adversaries (Red teams). But even expert
military Red teams are slaves to their own worldviews—and all players are sub-
ject to the sometimes insidious preconceptions of the controllers and assessors.
If Black Swans are truly unpredictable, much of that unpredictability literally is
due to the inability of people to imagine what is to them the unimaginable.
Contingencies like the abhorrent behavior at Abu Ghraib or the confusion of
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, and the resulting, respective media
firestorms, are Black Swans—unpredictable because they exist in a realm of pos-
sibilities where we do not want to go or where our cultures, life experiences,
imaginations, and worldviews block us from going.30 They are examples of the
unsanitary and unsavory set of problems that reflect badly on us, on those who
are designing and playing the games. Whether it’s our weapons systems not
working as promised, our contractors going over budget or time limits, or our
colleagues advancing their individual agendas at the expense of the overall orga-
nization, we too often don’t want to admit that such things happen. But they do.
And they often become the very things that decision makers have the hardest
time grappling with.
SO WHERE DID WE END UP?
Wargames are synthetic experiences; to make the most of them, we need to inte-
grate them with all the other tools (analysis, exercises, history, real-world experi-
ence) that we have available to help us make sense of what we can and should do
in the present and the future.31 Wargames derive their power (for good or ill)
from their nature as constructed narrative; they have a more powerful effect on
participants than do other narrative forms, because their participants not only
are spectators but must act, engaging parts of their intellect and emotions not
accessed during simple storytelling. Games are story-living experiences. By en-
gaging their players in ways more similar to acting in the real world than reading
a novel or watching a film can be, games affect their players in ways more deeply
remembered and more transformative of their personae than other techniques
for entertainment and learning. As a result, wargaming, gaming, serious gaming
—whatever we call it—is a powerful tool for affecting how people think, feel,
and behave.
In military environments, wargames have been important for at least two
centuries. In nonmilitary environments they have become more important and
more widely applied over the past fifty years. They offer us a promising means to
prepare decision makers for the complex and uncertain environments that the
pace and depth of change in global dynamics are driving, at ever more breath-
taking speeds and in ever more surprising directions.
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To deal effectively with the Black Swans lurking in our future—including
those unsanitary ones that too often drive the most serious effects of events but
that we prefer not to think about—our leaders need to develop synthetic experi-
ence, best available to them through such games. Those games need to move
away from our traditional approach to dealing with the uncertainties of the fu-
ture by trying to predict events based on assessment of relative probabilities. In-
stead, we need to focus on exploring events on the basis of their relative
consequences, less to prepare for specific consequences than to prepare our hu-
man decision-making apparatus for the physical, intellectual, and emotional
environments—full of complexity and uncertainty as they will be—in which
our leaders will have to decide, whatever specific events they confront.32
Games can do that, but only if their designers and those who sponsor and
fund them reverse their own internal priorities about what is important (stress-
ing tangible consequences rather than abstract probabilities) and what is true
(human reality rather than bureaucratic convenience). Games are powerful
tools that can create synthetic experiences even more powerful than some real
ones. Game designers, in turn, have a responsibility to ensure that their games
reflect the truth. We can help our players learn and internalize that truth only by
incorporating in our games not just our best understanding of the facts, as does
the best physical science, but also a fundamentally honest assessment of human
nature, like that found in the best literature.
In particular, high-engagement, role-playing games allow participants to in-
teract with other human beings in situations involving competition, conflict,
and cooperation—a great and necessary opportunity. But they are not without
their limitations:
• It is difficult to play such games in other than real time. Although accelerated
clock speeds and time jumps are possible, actual decision making cannot take
place in anything other than real time, no matter how we try to convince
ourselves otherwise, for the simple reason that humans can live and act only
in real time.
• It is difficult to record what happens and why with enough fidelity and
completeness to make it profitable and instructive to review and reflect
upon events and decisions.
• It is difficult to explore variations in the decisions made and what the out-
comes of those decisions might have been, especially to explore all the mis-
takes that we make.
• It is difficult to repeat an in-person, multiplayer game like a high-
engagement game and impossible to “replicate” it in the sense of a Monte
Carlo simulation experiment.
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As a result, high-engagement role-playing games can represent one crucial el-
ement of the learning process, but they cannot be the only element. No one form
of wargame can meet all our needs.
• We need high-engagement role-playing games to help decision makers ex-
perience interactions with other humans and also the emotional and psy-
chological effects of those interactions.
• We need board-game-like tools (that is, manually managed open systems)
to allow players to see (and even change) how elements of the game’s mod-
els work to translate decisions into effects and events, so as to calibrate both
those models and the insights the players derive from them and the play of
the game.
• We need computer-embodied games to allow for ease of recording, ease of
repeating, and ease of reflecting on experiences to assist in developing our
“commonsense” approaches to dealing with uncertain and complex situa-
tions, as Dietrich Dörner argues so effectively in The Logic of Failure.
Ultimately, to make better games we need to tell better stories. We need to
help our audiences learn better how to learn from those stories. Just as games,
analysis, exercises, and real-world experience are all important tools that we
need to integrate in a synergistic process, different types and modes of games
play their own distinct roles (pun fully intended). Yet all games derive their
power from the same source—their ability to open up their participants to
self-transformation through the power of shared and constructed narrative.
But while recognizing the power and utility of games, we must simulta-
neously remain aware of their potential for mischief, a potential they share with
all narrative forms. As our colleague and Naval War College professor Stephen
Downes-Martin pointed out in his comments on an early draft of this article, it’s
hard to beat Hitler’s Mein Kampf as an example of a narrative that exerted pow-
erful influence on its audience. Its narrative played on the reader’s emotions di-
rectly even while at times appearing to engage their intellects. Stephen has
argued repeatedly—and, with us, directly—about the need for wargaming to be
more than just an art form, to move into the realm of science. Artistic, narrative
truth is one thing; scientific truth (true facts?) another. How do we best combine
and balance them in our games?
This issue is one we hope to think about and explore farther in the future. For
now, however, we propose the following concluding thoughts, optimistic and
even triumphalist as they are.
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THE BOTTOM LINE
Wargames cannot escape their narrative nature, nor should we want them to.
But the use of wargames, the discipline we call “wargaming,” must adapt the tool
to the purpose. Like a film or a book, no game is purely entertainment; by creat-
ing an experience, albeit a synthetic one, all these narrative forms inform and
educate us to one extent or another. If we wargamers—we who create and em-
ploy these tools—are to fulfill our responsibility to our agencies, our companies,
our nation, and yes, our species, we must first recognize why wargaming works
and then apply its power in constructive and helpful ways to address the com-
plex and uncertain issues that we face now and will face in the future.
As a final postscript, we offer an even more expansive view of how gaming can
affect the real world and real people for the better—a prophetic vision from Jane
McGonigal, the director of game research and development at the Institute for
the Future:33
Reality doesn’t motivate us as effectively [as games do]. Reality isn’t engineered to
maximize our potential or to make us happy. . . .
When we play, we also have a sense of urgent optimism. We believe wholeheartedly
that we are up to any challenge, and we become remarkably resilient in the face of
failure. Research shows that gamers spend on average 80% of their time failing in
game worlds, but instead of giving up, they stick with the difficult challenge and use
the feedback of the game to get better. With some effort, we can learn to apply this
resilience to the real-world challenges we face. . . .
We can harness the power of game design to tackle real-world problems. We can em-
power gamers to use their virtual-world strengths to accomplish real feats. Indeed,
when game communities have been matched with challenging real-world problems,
they have already proven themselves capable of producing tangible, potentially
world-changing results. . . .
Those who understand this power will be the people who invent our future. We can
create rewarding, transformative games for ourselves and our families; for our
schools, businesses and neighborhoods; for an entire industry or an entirely new
movement.
We can play any games we want. We can create any future we can imagine. Let the
games begin.
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